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Shades of White Complicity: The End Conscription Campaign and the Politics 
of White Liberal Ignorance in South Africa
Daniel Conway
It has become a standing joke that since democracy in South Africa one 
cannot find anyone who supported apartheid. Increasingly some white 
South Africans claim that they did not know what was happening during 
apartheid; that it was not their generation that was responsible for 
apartheid, but that of their parents; and even that it was not as bad for 
black people during apartheid as it is for white South Africans in post-
apartheid South Africa.i
The public hearings and official reports of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) comprehensively documented how white South African complicity 
was essential to the political, economic and social operation of apartheid in all its 
multifaceted forms. In contemporary South Africa, white people deploy multiple 
discursive strategies to obscure, or misrepresent their complicity in the apartheid past 
and to make claims about their entitlements in the new South Africa. Melissa Steyn 
identified one such strategy of white complicity in the quotation above. The TRC’s 
official report observed another when it concluded ‘the white community often seemed 
either indifferent or plainly hostile to the work of the Commission’ii; many of whom 
dismissed the work of the TRC as that of the ‘crying and lying commission’.iii White 
conservatives were particularly sharp in their denunciation of, and disengagement from, 
the Commission: former President PW Botha refused to testify and his successor in 
office, FW de Klerk, withdrew from the process and used legal channels to successfully 
suppress the official conclusions of the TRC about his Presidency.iv White liberals, 
those who were actively opposed to apartheid either via white anti-apartheid 
organisations such as the Black Sashv or End Conscription Campaign (ECC)vi, or who 
were part of the institutionalised opposition in white parliamentary politics, such as the 
Progressive Federal Party (PFP)vii embraced the TRC more fully and have been more 
vocal in apparently proclaiming the non-racial values of the new South Africa. There 
were also whites active in the African National Congress (ANC) and the United 
Democratic Front (UDF)viii who would most likely have been critical of what they 
perceived as the complicity of white liberals and the institutions of white liberalism 
with apartheid and thereby more radically leftist and non-complicit in their political 
motivations. It does not follow, however, that whites who were actively opposed to 
apartheid were entirely free from complicity, or that they have subsequently embraced 
the values and political imperatives of the new South Africa. 
There are gradations and variations in levels of white complicity and these have 
varying social, political and economic consequences for South Africa. There is, of 
course, a difference between white conservative, white liberal and white radical 
responses to contemporary South Africa, as there were differences at the time when 
some whites openly opposed the principles and practices of apartheid whilst others 
actively supported and enforced them. As this chapter will argue, white liberals and 
white radicals were often complicit in white privilege during apartheid and faced 
difficult choices when choosing strategies of opposition to white minority rule. In the 
years following the end of apartheid, white liberals and the discourses of white 
liberalism in South Africa were also complicit in the perpetuation of an often partial, 
and sometimes entirely ignorant, knowledge about South Africa’s past and present. 
Furthermore, there is evidence that not only have some former white anti-apartheid 
activists struggled to accept the norms of the new South Africa, but they have been 
among the ANC’s most vocal critics, opposed to its racial “transformation” agenda and 
fiercely defensive of their socioeconomic position.ix White supremacy during apartheid 
presented a clear, morally reprehensible enemy. For many whites, white privilege as it 
manifests in the new South Africa does not do so. 
This chapter explores the politics of white complicity, both in terms of how the 
past is commemorated and obscured and how ongoing privilege is legitimated and 
justified. Essentially, I argue that these discourses are premised on intentional 
ignorance about the past and also a desire to ignore and discount inconvenient and 
disruptive perspectives, arguments and facts. As will be discussed below, in post-
apartheid South Africa, it has been very clear that white South African liberal 
discourses deliberately seek to shut down and discredit any critique of their position, or 
exposure of their ongoing racial privilege. This provides evidence that certain white 
discourses and white people are culpably ignorant of their complicity in ongoing white 
privilege. Focusing on contemporary debates about framing and commemorating white 
activism against apartheid, specifically, war resistance in 1980s South Africa, reveals 
how a particular group of white liberals seek to emphasise their agency in ending 
apartheid using discourses that are particularly brittle and hyper-vigilant to critique. 
The chapter’s focus is a reflexive account of researching and analysing the social and 
political activism of the End Conscription Campaign, a white led anti-apartheid 
movement and specifically the responses to published work and analysis of the ECC, 
including my published work and analyses. The ECC challenged many fundamental 
aspects of militarised apartheid governance, but my analysis of the movement also 
traced the compromises and contradictions of the ECC and the gendered political 
messages it posed. Furthermore, when researching in the 2000s, I became aware that 
former activists and conscientious objectors were keen to obscure divisions in the 
movement and emphasise their agency and heroism in opposing apartheid; narratives 
that fed into broader political discourses premised on white demands for socioeconomic 
and political entitlements in contemporary South Africa. As such, I explore the ethics 
of my own researching and writing of an aspect of apartheid history. I reflect on the 
complex and often sensitive dilemmas of maintaining intellectual integrity in analysing 
the movement whilst being aware, at the same time, that such a critique would be 
unwelcome and resisted by former activists. 
The chapter concludes that the outraged responses to analyses by some former 
ECC activists and resistance to the study and questioning of whiteness as a salient 
category of research is interrelated with the increased focus on supposed white suffering 
during apartheid (of conscripts and other soldiers) and the decentring of injustice 
suffered by the black population. For example, in focusing on the supposed ‘lingering, 
unspoken pain of white youth who fought for apartheid’ as conscripts,x one not only 
posits that whites did indeed suffer, but that discussion of that suffering becomes on a 
par with the gross injustices and abuses inflicted on the black population by whites (and 
white soldiers, in particular) during apartheid. This white “victim” paradigm 
legitimates a political claim that it is not only unjust to interrogate white complicity in 
apartheid and in ongoing racial privilege, but that it is the white community who are 
the real victims of post-apartheid South Africa. As I will outline below, the focus on 
white agents of apartheid as “victims” and the narratives of white anti-apartheid 
activists have aligned in the new South Africa and perform the same reactionary 
political function. Both seek to obscure and obfuscate analysis of previous roles played. 
Yet, whereas to have been an agent of apartheid may now be premised on either 
victimhood or denial, anti-apartheid activism emphasises heroism and entitlement. This 
prevents analysis of how they may have benefitted from and constituted themselves and 
their privileged position through apartheid, and obscures those who really suffered 
during apartheid. This in turn takes attention away from ongoing racist practices today, 
and hence becomes complicit in ongoing racial privilege. I argue that that these socio 
political narratives are premised on ‘white talk’xi and ‘white ignorance’:xii a politics of 
obscuring that is complicit with ongoing white privilege. Finally, the dilemmas I faced 
in researching and writing about the ECC activists and objectors and the responses to 
my published work provoked an uneasy feeling that I too had been complicit in centring 
white action in helping end apartheid.
Whiteness and Complicity in South Africa
The complicity of South African whites in apartheid has been a dominant theme of 
post-apartheid social and political discourses, and the complicity of whites in whiteness 
as a mode of racial privilege and domination has been evident and theorised 
transnationally. Conceptualising whiteness requires a focus on the operationalisation of 
racial privilege in social, material and embodied forms.xiii As with other power 
hierarchies, such as gendered and class based socioeconomic relations, white people 
are by their race to a degree complicit in inequality, prejudice and exploitation. Whites 
who wish to challenge and deconstruct whiteness as a form of racial domination face a 
difficult and contentious task.xiv Marilyn Frye makes a direct comparison between 
being white in society (‘whiteliness’) and gendered authority, i.e. being masculine. As 
she writes, ‘whiteliness, like being masculine, involves a belief in one’s authority and 
in one’s own experience as truth. In addition, whiteliness entails an unwillingness to be 
challenged that is protected by perceived white moral goodness’.xv The universal claim 
of whiteness to truth, knowledge and morality is brought in to sharp and unstable focus 
when whites and whiteness is analysed in South Africa. As one of the most infamous 
and violent institutionalised forms of white supremacy, apartheid automatically 
conferred political, social, legal and material benefits on the white community. 
Apartheid necessitated overt white complicity in political terms, i.e. voting for 
successive National Party governments to maintain white minority rule and from the 
1970s onwards, and in military terms, when compulsory conscription for all white men 
in the South African Defence Force (SADF) was instituted to defend the state against 
external and internal threat. This was in addition to the everyday racisms and silent 
complicity with injustice that apartheid required in order to perpetuate itself. The 
liberation struggle against apartheid and the negotiated transition to non-racial 
democracy in the 1990s necessitated some form of recognition that state enforced 
racism was wrong. Confronting and coming to terms with the country’s past has been 
more urgent than in other contexts, as addressing and overcoming racial division and 
the role of the white community in being both overtly and silently complicit with 
apartheid is an integral part of nation building. 
As discussed above, white liberals in South Africa have, superficially at least, 
proclaimed their support for the new non-racial dispensation, articulating what Steyn 
and Foster define as ‘new South Africa speak’.xvi However, by doing so white 
liberalism continues the logic of whiteness as the voice of authority, the definer of 
social and political reality and as being legitimate and righteous agents in the new order. 
By defining the terms of non-racialism, progress, transformation and tolerance, liberal 
whites also ensure that their status is preserved.xvii As Makgoba notes about 
contemporary whiteness in South Africa, ‘A very curious feature of our society and its 
transformation, is that those who were recently our oppressors, have now suddenly 
become experts and our saviours in transformation’.xviii Charles Mills, writing primarily 
about the US contexts, explains that the articulation of ‘a feel good history for 
whites’,xix in which whites create a more favourable, comfortable and morally righteous 
self-construction that is premised on the maintenance of ignorance. Applebaum argues 
that ‘while not only whites are susceptible to white ignorance, whites are particularly 
susceptible because they have the most to gain from remaining ignorant’.xx Indeed, 
Mills considers ignorance to be a foundational aspect of the ‘racial contract’ that 
perpetuates white power and disempowers black subjects.xxi To argue that whites, 
across national and temporal contexts, are complicit in ignorance raises questions about 
moral agency and culpability. It also raises the question as to whether claiming that 
whites collectively engage in a ‘passion for ignorance’xxii and on at least some 
conscious level avoid or denounce ‘difficult knowledge’ that could destabilise their 
moral self-image, risks invoking Arendt’s caution that ‘where all are guilty, nobody is’ 
and therefore no-one in particular can be held culpable.xxiii However, as the South 
African case demonstrates, many whites proclaim ignorance when even the mere 
question of complicity in racial inequality and past injustice is raised and denial of 
complicity becomes a characterising feature of white ignorance.xxiv This does not mean 
that all white South Africans are equally culpable in the crimes of apartheid. Indeed, 
white liberal activists were not ignorant of the injustices of apartheid; that is why they 
actively opposed them. However, as will be discussed below, the extent and premises 
of this opposition were variable and controversial at the time. There is an ongoing 
‘ignorance’ in denying these variations and this has major implications for 
contemporary discourses of whiteness. More broadly, it is accurate to claim that all 
whites were economic, social and, in broad terms, political beneficiaries of apartheid. 
Therefore, all whites were complicit in apartheid to some degree. 
One could argue that because of the highly bounded and authoritarian nature of 
apartheid and the material, social and political advantages automatically conferred on 
white South Africans, non-complicity was not possible for whites during apartheid. The 
reasons for opposing apartheid and the expectations of what political situation would 
emerge from this challenge diverged considerably between white liberals, both during 
apartheid and in the post-apartheid era. As the former ECC activist, Janet Cherry 
remarked in the 1980s, ‘we [white anti-apartheid activists] all go through a process, to 
some extent, of breaking away from our backgrounds and our parents and from our 
very sheltered upbringings’ in order to challenge apartheid from within white society. 
This breach from white society implies rejection, defiance and non-complicity. 
However, as Cherry states, ‘breaking away’ was ‘to some extent’ and varied between 
activists and also over time.xxv There were degrees of complicity and non-complicity 
and white liberal activists faced difficult choices in situating their protest in radical, or 
complicit terms. The fraught dynamics of white complicity in apartheid led to friction 
within and between the white anti-apartheid organisations, as fierce debates about, for 
example, to what extent the movements should be openly allied to the PFP, or the 
organisations led by the black community, were continually conducted. The desire to 
radically reject apartheid and white social norms sat uneasily with a perceived need to 
be heard by white society and also to appear respectable in white political and social 
terms. As beneficiaries of the apartheid system, white anti-apartheid activists in South 
Africa struggled to fully reject their complicity in that system. 
Intentional Ignorance
Ignorance, as an ongoing collective social process, is apparent in South Africa, where 
distinct modes of white discourse, or ‘white talk’xxvi serve to create common sense 
understandings of the socioeconomic and political order that exclude alternatives and 
quickly and often viciously discipline voices of dissent. As such, complicity may be 
accomplished via a ‘white ignorance contract’.xxvii This contract is not premised on an 
absolute ignorance of history or present realities, in the terms that individuals are not 
and could not possibly be aware of the country’s history or broader society, but more 
generally it is an ignorance, in either intentional or unintentional/unconscious terms, 
that serves to perpetuate racial hierarchies and neutralise threats to expose or destabilise 
white privilege. As an economically powerful racial minority that enforced and upheld 
a violent white supremacist state until 1994, Steyn and Foster argue that ‘the central 
question for whiteness in post-apartheid South Africa can be put simply: how to 
maintain privilege in a situation in which black people have achieved political 
power’.xxviii ‘White talk’, according to Steyn and Foster intentionally ‘represents the 
New South Africa in an attempt to define the terms by which (not only white) people 
will understand it, and relate to it. A great deal is at stake in the battle over whose 
definitions of the current and transforming social, economic and political arrangements 
and developments should prevail’.xxix White ignorance is, by its very definition, 
unstable and subject to contestation: the discursive struggles about the TRC and the 
subsequent disavowal of white South Africa’s complicity with apartheid reveal the 
fraught social process of attempting to maintain ignorance. 
The presentation of the past continues to frame political, academic and social 
debates. Dissenting voices (particularly white voices) that highlight or problematise 
ongoing racial privilege, who critique the articulation of “feel good” histories for 
whites, or who even raise and discuss openly the topic of whiteness and complicity 
have been targeted for criticism. A common feature of responses to academics, social 
commentators or politicians whom debate or critique whiteness is the use of personal 
and ad hominem insult, demonstrating a desire to discipline, delegitimise and silence 
critique. These responses range from shutting (and shouting) down discussion, to 
violence directed against those who speak about white guilt and complicity. For 
example, Samantha Vice, who wrote in an academic paper that white South Africans 
should accept their moral guilt in apartheid and act with humility and often silence in 
public discourse, was met with media denouncement and bitter criticism of Vice and 
insults directed against her in internet chat rooms.xxx Melissa Steyn has been subject to 
sexist abuse and violent threats on internet forums as a result of her work on 
whiteness.xxxi A former South African paratrooper physically assaulted Anton van 
Niekerk in his university office after he had published a paper arguing that white South 
Africans should accept their guilt for the past.xxxii In response to an international 
conference about whiteness held at the University of the Witwatersrand in 2013, a 
national newspaper editor wrote that research into whiteness was ‘boring’, ‘naval 
gazing’ and irrelevant in a South Africa that was now claimed to be meritocratic and 
non-racial.xxxiii Ultimately, these speech and physical acts attempt to deflect attention 
from whiteness as a mode of privilege, maintain white ignorance about the past and 
sidestep questions of complicity. 
South African universities have become the focus for increasingly bitter 
contestations of white power and white liberalism. In these contestations, white 
academics and university managers are faced with a literal loss of power and more 
broadly the loss of a key site for maintaining and perpetuating white discursive and 
material privilege in South Africa. More broadly, white liberalism, that defines the 
university as its model, embodying free speech, tolerance and progressivenessxxxiv 
stands accused of perpetuating racial privilege, ignoring the racial injustices of the past 
and stunting the development and racial transformation of South African society.xxxv In 
order to preserve their personal positions of power (essentially, to keep their jobs) and 
more broadly to preserve the European liberal model of the university and define the 
terms by which inclusion and exclusion operates at the university, white liberals have 
been intentionally ignorant and on occasion, exceptionally aggressive in defending their 
power. In this defence, their peers and contemporaries in the media have often aided 
them in this ‘new South Africa speak’.xxxvi This is because predominantly English 
speaking universities, such as the University of Cape Town (UCT) and the University 
of the Witwatersrand (Wits), English language newspapers, such as the Rand Daily 
Mail (later the Mail and Guardian) and both English and Afrikaans speaking academics 
were at the forefront of white opposition and activism against apartheid. As a result, 
white liberals have sought to emphasise that transformation should not apply to them, 
as they were former opponents of apartheid and that therefore their ongoing privilege 
should remain unquestioned. As a profile of a senior white professor at Wits, who was 
seeking to remove a black Pro-Vice Chancellor who was critical of white liberal 
academics, noted:
for years, his generation of Wits academics have been fighting 
conservatism from above and preparing themselves to take over the 
running of the institution according to their non-racial principles and 
model of transformation. Now, at the very moment they should be given 
their chance, the vagaries of history mean that black people must be at 
the helm.xxxvii
The sense of collective entitlement and injustice engendered when whites are called 
on to step aside has occasionally and very suddenly evolved into high profile 
struggles played out in the media and in parliament. The ‘hidden transcripts’ of 
tensions about South Africa’s racial transition erupt into ‘life or death’ rhetorical and 
political struggles when they emerge.xxxviii As ideological battles, and protests that 
have grown more widespread and bitter, these life and death struggles in South 
African universities have been increasingly difficult to resolve. In 2015, Siona 
O’Connell, a mixed-race academic at the UCT was the recipient of hate mail and 
was ‘pretty much ostracised’ by her white colleagues after writing an article 
complaining that UCT had failed to adequately racially transform its staff profile 
and was still predominantly white.xxxix Less than two months later there were mass 
student protests at UCT, led by black students, demanding the removal of a statue of 
British imperialist Cecil Rhodes from the campus and calling for UCT to increase 
the number of black academics and adopt a more inclusive policy towards black 
students.xl
The #RhodesMustFall protests spread to other universities in South Africa and 
prompted a national debate about racial transformation (or lack thereof) in the South 
African media. Some white South African academics have been particularly strident 
in at once proclaiming support for racial transformation yet denouncing the tactics 
and the rationale of the protestors. For example, UCT academics Jeremy Seekings 
and Niccoli Nattrass argued that the #RhodesMustFall protests ‘foster an intolerance 
of both the diversity of opinion and of reasoned deliberation’.xli Rebecca Hodes, also 
at UCT, criticised the movement for placing racial injustice at the centre of its 
demands, accused it of violent acts and vandalism, and mounted a blinkered defence 
of white liberalism in South Africa. As the protestors themselves noted, Hodes had 
‘gone to great lengths to ignore the contributions of the #RhodesMustFall movement 
by dehistoricising and decontextualising our activities’.xlii Seekings, Nattrass and 
Hodes’ responses (along with earlier hostile white liberal responses to 
transformation at universities, such as by Robert Morrell),xliii all seek to discipline, 
silence and debase efforts to racially transform South African universities and by 
extension, South African society. As such, they use discourses of “white talk”, 
premised on white liberalism, to defend their ongoing privilege and distract attention 
from the reality of that ongoing privilege and the injustices it perpetuates. At UCT, 
the statue of Rhodes was removed, but the protests and demands to change the racial 
profile of the institution’s students and staff are ongoing and have broadened to 
incorporate other issues of racial injustice. That these tensions are so vividly exposed 
and played out in higher education reveals the contradictions between white liberals 
who argue they embody the spirit of racial tolerance and progressiveness and the 
criticism that white liberals have failed to fully respond to or accept contemporary 
political and social realities in South Africa. The accusation here is that white liberals 
essentially are actively and intentionally complicit in defending and perpetuating 
ongoing forms of racial privilege. They are also culpably enforcing ignorance by 
denying and obscuring the full contours of racial injustice and exclusion in South 
African higher education. 
The Researching and Writing of White Narratives
As discussed above, neither the Truth and Reconciliation process nor the publication of 
the TRC’s findings settled the question of an official narrative of apartheid or a truly 
reconciled national community open about acknowledging complicity in past 
injustices. In the absence of this settled national narrative about the past, different 
strands of “white talk” have sought to rewrite the historical narratives of late apartheid. 
These different strands reveal different degrees of complicity in both the past and 
present. For example, former white conscripts and soldiers have become increasingly 
vocal about their personal and collective histories in the SADF via internet chat rooms, 
dedicated websites and works of fiction and non-fiction on sale across the book shops 
and newsagents of South Africa. White liberals in the media and academia have 
increasingly reproduced these narratives. Such sources either celebrate the SADF and 
ruminate on the betrayal of former troops by political elites, or somewhat 
disingenuously proclaim the former wars as ‘unpopular’ while reproducing nostalgic 
accounts of life in the army, as a bestselling non-fiction book did.xliv An entire genre of 
fiction has arisen about national service and an academic subdiscipline focusing on the 
“legacies” of apartheid’s wars has developed.xlv
In these discourses the negative affects of militarisation on whites is 
emphasised: the evidence for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in former troops; 
the coming to terms with wars that were “lost” and unjust; and the claim that whites 
were both made victims of apartheid by being subject to conscription and dehumanised 
by participating in racism.xlvi While there is evidence, in terms of interpersonal 
violence, suicide and other social problems, for the negative effects and legacies of 
militarisation, centring white narratives risks marginalising the main victims of 
apartheid: black South Africans and the southern African region. The focus on PTSD 
in particular has been criticised as being used by former white troops as an ‘alibi for 
avoiding accountability for their actions during the conflict’.xlvii The proclaiming of 
white heroism or victimhood as a legacy of militarisation has characterised white 
conservative attempts to justify past actions and denounce the present political 
settlement, but the desire to emphasise heroism and/or victimhood is also apparent in 
white liberal talk, and both discursive strategies seek to place whites at the centre of 
public discourse and deflects attention from, and hence becomes complicit in, ongoing 
white socioeconomic privilege and the perpetuation of black disadvantage in post-
apartheid South Africa. 
White Non-Complicity in Apartheid?
As I have written elsewhere,xlviii conscientious objectors to military service in the 1980s 
and the members of the ECC can rightly claim to have opposed the militarised and 
racist norms of apartheid South Africa. My research on the ECC and its subsequent 
publication forms part of the cultural discourse on white complicity in apartheid and 
the legacies of apartheid on white society. As such, it is part of a contentious and 
politicised field and subject to the same discursive and disciplining pressures. In my 
work, I conceptualised the gendered nature of apartheid South Africa’s militarisation, 
exploring the ECC as a new social movement that opposed the compulsory conscription 
of all white men into the SADF and interviewed white men who objected to military 
service for political reasons. The ECC and conscientious objectors worked in a fraught 
and contested environment, one in which family and friends could ostracise them for 
the political stance they had taken and where the state, and a plethora of social and 
popular discourses, stigmatised them as masquerading political arguments for what was 
actually motivated by cowardice, naivety, communism and/or sexual deviance. In this 
contested environment there were internal pressures about how to best present a 
campaigning message in order to be heard by a generally unreceptive white audience. 
As a campaign tactic the ECC eventually adopted a language and identity that was 
unthreatening to conservative white norms. These tensions around the need to appear 
respectable in white social and political norms, or to be radically challenging in 
activism and political standpoints brought questions about complicity to the fore. 
In 2013, I was contacted by a South African based research student who 
commented that the former ECC activists she had interviewed ‘have a very clear 
tendency to put across a particular view and history of the ECC and its members – 
combined with a positive representation and general lack of critique’.xlix This very much 
reflected my own experience of researching the ECC (with the exception of Ivan Toms, 
who was candid about divisions centred on his trial for objection). Evidence of divisions 
over strategy and personality were evident in archives as well as in previous research.l 
It is perhaps not surprising that a social or political movement would have controversies 
or divisions, yet some former ECC activists were insistent there were none and angry 
that I discussed such divisions and debates in my work. Conducting the research in the 
early to mid 2000s, I became aware how strongly former objectors wanted to emphasise 
their contribution and the sacrifice they had made to bring about the new South Africa. 
I also saw how they, in different ways, felt overlooked in the new dispensation, being 
categorised with other whites who had upheld the system. Affirmative action policies 
in South Africa have more broadly become a critical aspect of “white talk” and a policy 
through which whites proclaim their “victim” status or as proof of the ANC’s 
maladministration of the country and some former objectors felt they should not be 
subject to such policies and were annoyed that they had been.li It was clear in my 
research interviews and in subsequent conversations and forums where former ECC 
activists discussed their life histories, that some openly supported the ANC 
government, whereas others bitterly opposed it. Helen Zille, a former leading activist 
in the ECC, became an opposition politician in the Western Cape and later leader of the 
official opposition party, Democratic Alliance (DA). In this context I became aware 
that there were expectations of me to present a specific narrative about the ECC that 
suited specific political ends and that this narrative should erase any reflection on 
controversies or divisions in the past.
In 2009, an End Conscription Campaign 25th anniversary event was held at the 
Spier Wine Estate and resort outside of Cape Town. It was a glamorous occasion 
opened by Premier of the Western Cape, Helen Zille and closed by the Deputy President 
of South Africa. Art and photography exhibitions, discussions and music were the 
centre of the commemorations. By contrast, a colleague of mine observed what a sad 
sight she had witnessed when attending the small anniversary event held by the black 
former soldiers of the armed wing of the ANC (MK) the previous year, ‘they have been 
entirely left behind’ she remarked and appeared to be in poor health and poverty. In my 
subsequent book, I discussed how some former members of the ECC didn’t want to 
hold an anniversary event in 2009, considering it inappropriate for what had been a 
white movement during apartheid to do so, or others who wanted to invite the then 
youth leader of the ANC Julius Malema (Malema has often been sharply critical of the 
white community and at various times has demanded faster racial transformation 
including nationalisation of white industries and land restitution) to the event, to ‘show 
him’ that whites had contributed to the liberation struggle in an attempt to stop his 
frequent criticisms of and hostility towards the white community.lii When at the event, 
the most frequent public remark I heard was “where is our voice?” in a society that fell 
short of the ideals the former activists had apparently believed in. “Where is our voice” 
also seemed to be code for where was the voice of white South Africa. The event was 
covered positively and extensively in the local and national press. A documentary about 
the event was produced and narrated by Desmond Tutu. Former divisions in the 
movement could be discerned at the event, cheers of adulation greeted the introductory 
welcome by Helen Zille by some in the audience, but others muttered at how they had 
never supported Zille because of her then allegiance to the white liberal PFP. In the 
discussions during the weekend some openly expressed their ongoing support for the 
ANC government, others bitterly attacked it. Former activists reflected on their 
motivations for involvement in the campaign, for some there were deeply held political 
convictions, others personal fears for the future of their children as potential conscripts, 
but some were open that their involvement was socially motivated: the ECC was a space 
for alternative youth culture, music, sex and the political motives and potential dangers 
associated with anti-apartheid activism were largely obscured. 
It was in this highly politicised environment that my book on the End 
Conscription Campaign was published in 2012. As an academic book, I had not fully 
anticipated how easily accessible it would be in South Africa and thus how widespread 
its impact would be. Published in paperback, it was widely distributed across South 
Africa and sold alongside the other literature about South Africa’s apartheid wars 
through mainstream bookshops in shopping malls and airports. With hindsight, the 
nature of South African society and the fact that a white liberal elite continues to occupy 
the higher echelons of sections of the media and society meant that the work was read 
and commented on beyond the usual confines of academia. As the first single study to 
be published about the ECC in the post-apartheid era, I was aware that I might be 
subject to opprobrium from former ECC activists and other white South Africans who 
could be deeply invested in particular modes of presenting their past activism for 
contemporary political ends. By reflecting on what I had observed at the ECC 
anniversary, on the divisions of the ECC and even by adopting a feminist and gendered 
analysis my work may be interpreted very differently in white popular culture as 
opposed to peer academics. 
In 2013, I was invited to speak at an academic conference at Rhodes University 
about the “Legacies of Apartheid’s Wars” and at the South African National Arts 
Festival about my work. In the weeks leading up to the conference, an article was 
published in the Mail and Guardian newspaper attacking my book. I was given no right 
of reply. Written by a former ECC activist, the article took exception to almost every 
aspect of the work, from the front cover (that reproduced an ECC poster), the wording 
of the title, to the referencing style (in text), the use of academic language and theory, 
the focus on gender and women activists, the implication that the ECC’s tactics were 
in any way related to the broader liberation movement’s ‘shift’ in the later 1980s and 
also the claim that there were divisions in the movement (the ECC was ‘factionless’ 
according to the author, if not the evidence present in the archives.liii The article also 
misrepresented a number of key arguments and entirely ignored others. I recalled how 
the white editor of the Mail and Guardian had also been present at the ECC anniversary 
celebrations and the newspaper had published some of the most glowing tributes to the 
movement at the time. Evans’s article sought to debase the analysis of the ECC in the 
same terms as white conservative and white liberal attacks on academic and other 
critiques of white privilege discussed previously. As such, it was a discourse sought to 
maintain ignorance about the past. 
Upon arriving at the conference I realised that the main focus of the event was on 
white experiences of apartheid rather than on South African society more broadly. 
Attendees were mainly white former SADF soldiers, privileged white former ECC 
activists and South African liberal white academics and authors of works of fiction that 
focus on apartheid wars. The conference organiser introduced herself as the Director of 
the Legacies of the Apartheid Wars Project, and announced that the conference would 
be a “healing space” for “compassionate conversations” between former foes, albeit 
predominantly between white people. It was a deeply uncomfortable experience, 
sharpened not least because the venue of Rhodes University is itself a predominantly 
white institution that embodies a lack of transformation and was in complete contrast 
to the poverty of the township at the opposite end of the city. The focus on the effects 
of conscription and apartheid wars on white society, ranging from post-traumatic stress 
disorder, to suicide and guilt seemed more premised on re-centring white experiences 
of apartheid and claiming and pro-claiming white victimhood, than a more productive 
exploration of ongoing racial inequalities and white agency (or lack of) in 
socioeconomic transformation. It was a white space, without critically interrogating 
whiteness or the ongoing white privilege in South Africa.
It became clear that the discourses at the conference were premised on forms of 
white liberal ignorance and complicity. The chair of my panel at the conference 
announced that some former ECC members had, in light of the Mail and Guardian 
review, refused to attend the conference because of my presence. At the conference 
some former activists loudly attacked me for my work, although, by their own 
admission, none had actually read my book. However, they had read the Mail and 
Guardian review. One member of the audience even announced that she had not read 
the book and would refuse to read it in the future - something I considered to be a 
remarkable expression of ignore-ance and intolerance to academic discourse. Although 
a difficult experience, it was a somewhat unsurprising one and I reflected on what it 
revealed (and also concealed) about discourses of whiteness in contemporary South 
Africa. By polemically attacking my socio political analysis of the ECC (and my right 
to even embark of the study as a younger, UK born “outsider”) and even refusing to 
read the work, the audience reflected how the white liberal discourses at the conference 
were premised on ignorance and a desire to present a celebratory and unproblematised 
account of white social and political agency in ending apartheid. The attacks mirrored 
those directed to other white (and black) academics that critique whiteness and also in 
similar terms, inflating what might have been an intellectual discussion about the 
analysis of a now defunct political movement into a “life or death” struggle over whose 
narrative would prevail in the account of the recent past. 
This is a struggle that has taken place in South African academia, but in 2013 it 
was also taking place in South African politics. In 2013, the Democratic Alliance (DA) 
party, South Africa’s official opposition that emerged out of the white liberal PFP, 
launched a campaign to highlight the contribution of the former PFP MP, Helen 
Suzman to the anti-apartheid struggle and also the anti-apartheid (and ECC) activism 
of the current DA leader, Helen Zille. The DA’s message, that white liberals were and 
remain at the vanguard of the liberation struggle and that the black government has 
betrayed the ideals of liberation provoked considerable controversy, with debate 
focusing on the legitimacy of the old white parliament and the reality and extent of 
Helen Suzman’s actual opposition to or complicity with apartheid governance.liv The 
responses to my work drew from and took place within this discursive context, and 
reveal a desire to control and frame the ECC’s history with an aim to maximise and 
celebrate white agency in ending apartheid: narratives that belie the evidence held in 
the archives. These narratives also sought to wrest focus away from black experiences 
during apartheid, shifting it to white experiences. In debunking critique of white liberal 
activism during apartheid, “white talk” sought to construct and valorise white heroes of 
the liberation movement, and re-centre whites as the authority of South African history 
and society.
Academic research can be used to confer legitimacy and importance upon actors 
and movements. Moreover, merely publishing research amplifies the significance of 
the research subject. This can generate further discourse that influences popular 
perceptions. I believe I was invited, in part, to the Legacy of Apartheid’s Wars 
conference and to the South African National Arts Festival in order to provide this 
academic legitimacy and amplification. In many respects I had been complementary 
about the ECC, and objectors and had demonstrated how their campaigns had helped 
destablise militarisation and increase white social and political fractures that fed into 
the demise of apartheid. However, in my book I openly discussed the politicised and 
problematic nature of white discourses about activist pasts in contemporary South 
Africa and critiqued the movement’s rationale and divisions. In addition, my book was 
on sale in popular bookshops across South Africa and reviewed by the popular press. 
In resisting complicity to conforming to the white liberal narrative of the ECC and 
seeking to expose and destabilise intentional white ignorance, whilst having a relatively 
high public profile for my published work and presence at the National Arts Festival, I 
marked myself as a target. Attacks on my work sought to undermine legitimate 
academic discourse, and served as an opportunity to overemphasise the ECC’s role in 
ending apartheid and narratives of white agency in ending apartheid.
Conclusion
Transnationally, all white people are complicit to a greater or lesser extent in “the Racial 
Contract” that confers privilege and entitlement to whites and whiteness. In South 
Africa, the breach of this racial contract by the dramatic ending of apartheid, the 
election of a black led government and the open exploration of the past and who should 
be held to account for it, has raised the stakes for whites, who now potentially see their 
positions of privilege exposed and their power diminished. The desire to present the 
ECC in only heroic terms and to aggressively “shout down” non-insiders from 
analysing or critiquing the history of the movement reveals not only intentional 
ignorance and a commitment to modernist and reductive understandings of history, but 
a desire to keep whites and whiteness at the centre and displace black experiences, both 
in the past and the present. The rise of the focus on the legacies of apartheid’s wars, 
both in popular culture and academia has primarily been concerned with white 
“suffering” and thus with the construction of a notion white “victimhood” equivalent 
to and even superseding the experience of black people during apartheid. This directly 
contributes to the white conservative claims that it is whites that suffer and are the 
victims of the new South Africa. In this complex and fraught political context, I as a 
researcher and writer faced a dilemma over the extent of my personal complicity and I 
was well aware when writing my PhD and subsequent publications that I was balancing 
academic integrity with the expectations of those I researched to tell their story in the 
terms they wanted. By not fully satisfying the latter, I unintentionally provoked a “life 
or death” discursive struggle about the “hidden transcripts” of white South Africa’s 
past. 
It has become commonplace in contemporary South Africa for white liberals to 
loudly denounce other political and social actors who threaten to expose or damage 
their ongoing racial privilege, as well as to define the terms of debate in their own self 
interest. As Pierre De Vos commented, when discussing the DA’s rebranding of its 
white liberal apartheid past, ‘how you engage with the past is profoundly political. But 
because of the explosive political power of the past and the real and imaginary memory 
of it, there is a tendency to simplify the past to suit individuals’ emotional and political 
or other selfish needs.lv White liberals dominant position in leading universities and 
media outlets of the country, as well as their ongoing economic and (in some 
geographical locations) political power gives them the opportunity to occupy and to a 
greater or lesser extent control very influential public platforms. In response to 
challenge and critique “white talk”, combines a disingenuous proclamation of support 
for the post-apartheid socio political order with a simultaneous rejection of the very 
means by which such an order can really come to pass and a genuinely empowered 
black community can arise. My experiences with the former ECC activists and 
objectors, as a researcher and later as an author, is a small, but vivid example of how a 
section of white liberals seek to discipline and reject any critique that threatens their 
perceived power interests and to exploit the opportunity to re-centre focus on 
themselves and decentre black experiences. The broader and sharp social and political 
conflicts that continue to arise in South African universities reveal both the lack of 
genuine transformation at those institutions and the efforts and lengths to which white 
liberal academics and university managers will go to preserve their personal and 
ideological positions. In these struggles, how the past is framed relates to how whites 
sit as privileged subjects in the present. 
If white liberals are complicit in ongoing racial privilege and are culpably or 
unintentionally perpetuating ignorance about the past and present, how should whites 
respond in contemporary South Africa? Melissa Steyn believes that some white liberals 
are making demands for recognition about their activist pasts that they do not deserve: 
‘being part of the [anti-apartheid] struggle by choice was vastly different from fighting 
for one’s survival due to being trapped by apartheid’s racism’.lvi She argues, further, 
that ‘petulance for not being rewarded for past contribution to the cause only betrays 
that an element of paternalism must have informed the choice in the first place’.lvii From 
this perspective former ECC activists should accept their place in South African history 
as a marginal one and aside from the main dynamics of the black Liberation Struggle. 
They should also be aware of their ongoing and highly privileged status in an unequal 
South Africa. For Vice, because of white complicity and unresolved guilt, the 
community should be silent in political affairs.lviii Eusebius McKasier, qualifies this and 
says that actually whites do have the right to speak, but he advises South Africa’s white 
population to be 
mindful of how your whiteness still benefits you and gives you unearned 
privileges. Engage black South Africans with humility, and be mindful 
of not reinforcing whiteness as normative, just as a loud, boisterous, 
rugby-obsessive chief executive should take care of his unearned 
privileges as an aggressive, masculine male in the boardroom.lix
White liberals have mostly disregarded this advice and it remains imperative that 
scholars and public commentators continue to expose and deconstruct both white 
complicity and white ignorance about the past and present racial injustices in South 
Africa.
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